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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
the stockholders. That is, they are not trustees of an express trust as to which
the statute of limitations does not run. They do, however, owe a fiduciary
duty to the stockholders and courts of equity have held them to the same
standards of trust as apply to other fiduciaries.' 8 Therefore, to give effect to
this legislative declaration the directors of a dissolved corporation should be
held to the same standards.
In order to answer the second question it is necessary to characterize the
cause of action as individual or dervative in nature. Section 106 of the Stock
Corporation Law does not provide a period of limitation. This does not mean
that no period is applicable, but that the provisions of the New York Civil
Practice Act applies. Section 48(8) of the New York Civil Practice Act pro-
vides a six-year period for all actions in law or in equity, and provides that
they both be treated under the same section. However, this Section does not
include actions by individual shareholders brought in their own right against
the directors. In the instant case the wrong alleged by the petitioners is that
the shares were not ratably distributed. This is not an injury to the cor-
poration but one to the individual shareholders. "It is obvious that wrongful
acts by directors or other managers, may result in direct injuries to individual
shareholder, entitling the latter to sue for their own benefit.' 9 If this action
is characterized as an individual cause of action, as it should be, then the
appropriate period of limitations is ten years as provided by Section 53 of the
New York Civil Practice Act.
The dissent argues that since there was an adequate remedy at law the
choice to proceed in equity cannot enlarge the period of limitations.2 0 However,
it is difficult to see how the cause of action could be described as derivative in
nature. The complaint does not allege a wrongful liquidation but the failure
to ratably distribute. Although the complaint prayed that the relief be given
to the corporation, the object of the action is to recover upon a chose in action
belonging to the shareholders, not to compel the directors to perform a duty
they owe to the corporation.
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT WILL NOT PREVENT APPLICATION OF REAL PROPERTY
TAX LAW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Once a petition for a corporate reorganization proceeding under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act 1 is approved, the Federal Court obtains exclusive
jurisdiction over the debtor's property and no other court has the power to
18. 3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations § 1301 (1947).
19. Baker and Cary, Corporations 599 (3d ed. 1959).
20. Keys v. Leopold, 241 N.Y. 189, 149 N.E. 82S (1925).
1. 11 US.C. § 501 et seq.
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make any valid orders affecting this property.2 This preemption by the Federal
Court is self-executing upon the entry of the order approving the reorganiza-
tion petition.3
The plaintiff in George F. Weaver Sons Company v. Burgess,4 relied on this
preemption doctrine to set aside three deeds, two to the defendant City of
Utica and one from the latter to the defendant Burgess. The City in 1942 and
1943, at a time when the plaintiff was in a corporate reorganization proceeding
under Chapter X, instituted in rem tax foreclosure actions against Weaver Sons,
which resulted in the deeds to the City.5 The City later conveyed one of the
deeds to Burgess. The defendants relied upon the applicable two year Statute
of Limitations.0
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, reversing the Appellate Divi-
sion. While conceding that the tax foreclosure proceedings against Weaver Sons
were jurisdictionally defective absent federal court approval, the Court of Ap-
peals nevertheless held that Weaver Sons was barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions and that such a holding would not violate the supreme law of the land
as reflected in the Bankruptcy Act.
The Court differentiated between merely jurisdictional defects which would
not prevent reliance upon a limitations provision, and a defect which renders
the proceeding a nullity. In the latter instance a Statute of Limitations may not
be available because of the absence of the very condition for bringing the pro-
ceedings. An example of this would be where the taxes on the land had actually
been paid but nevertheless in rem tax foreclosure proceedings were initiated.7
But in this case the defect did not arise upon the absence of a statutory condi-
tion precedent to the commencement of the tax foreclosure act. It was therefore
held that the two year Statute of Limitations was available to the defendants.
In deciding the question of Federal supremacy over state courts in Bank-
ruptcy proceedings the Court held that its decision would not disregard exclusive
Federal authority in this area. Once a Chapter X reorganization proceeding has
terminated, however, state courts are automatically revested with jurisdiction
2. 11 U.S.C. § 511:
The court in which a petition (for reorganization) is filed shall, for the purposes
of this chapter, have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property, wherever
located.
11 U.S.C. § 548:
Until otherwise ordered by the judge, an order approving a petition shall operate
as a stay... of any act or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the debtor's
property.
3. Matter of Maler Brewing Co., 38 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Cal. 1941); 6 Collier, Bank-
ruptcy 1798 (14th ed. 1947).
4. 7 N.Y.2d 172, 196 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1959).
5. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1120 et seq.
6. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 1136:
Every deed given pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be-presumptive
evidence that the actions and all proceedings prior thereto . . . were regular and
in accordance with all provisions of law relating thereto. After two years from
the date of the record of such deed, the presumption shall be conclusive.
7. Cameron Estates v. Deering, 308 N.Y. 24, 123 N.E.2d 621 (1954).
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and are free to proceed with a tax foreclosure against the debtors.8 The present
case was not commenced by Weaver Sons until four years after the Chapter X
proceedings were terminated and Weaver Sons had been restored to its ordinary
status, and nearly twelve years after the defendant Burgess had recorded his
deed from the City. Conceding then that federal supremacy may require that
the Statute of Limitations be tolled during this period of reorganization the two
year period nevertheless expired because more than four years had elapsed from
the termination of the reorganization.
FRAUD MUST BE PROVEN, NoT PRESUMED
The issue raised in Chemical Corn Exchange Bank v. WassungO was
whether a fraudulant intent by the defendant to conceal information concern-
ing his financial condition had been proven.
In March, 1956, the plaintiff discounted three notes for the defendant
which were subsequently paid. At that time, the plaintiff obtained from the
defendant a financial statement of his net worth. Between October and Decem-
ber of the same year, the plaintiff discounted five more notes for the defendant.
The plaintiff discounted the notes on the alleged oral assertion by the defendant
that there was no material change in his financial condition since the first notes
were discounted. These notes were not paid. The maker thereof was adjudged
a bankrupt and discharged, as was the defendant. To escape the bankruptcy
discharge, the plaintiff brought this action on the theory that the defendant had
fraudulently induced the plaintiff to discount the notes and that they were
ignorant of the alleged fraud when the discharge in bankruptcy was entered.10
At the trial, the defendant admitted that the real estate assets listed on
the statement were over stated and that they had been sold for considerably less
than appeared on the statement prior to the discounting of the five notes. Be-
cause of these admissions, the trial court found that the defendant intended
to conceal information concerning his financial condition and the statement
that there was no material change in his financial condition was fraudulent. The
Appellate Division reversed, holding that, "There is neither proof of deliberate
concealment of material facts with intent to defraud nor, ... is there evidence
of reckless disregard of truth." l
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division holding, that the
plaintiff did not sustain the burden of establishing fraudulent intent. The ma-
jority pointed out that assuming the listed real estate was over stated and that
the defendant had said there was no material change in his financial condition,
fraudulent intent was not proven. With no proof as to defendant's actual net
worth plus the fact that the five notes were assets not listed on the statement,
8. Town of Agawam v. Commors, 159 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1947).
9. 7 N.Y.2d 337, 197 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1960).
10. 11 US.C. § 35.
11. 8 A.D.2d 788, 187 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (1st Dep't 1959).
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